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New Treatment of Multiple Corporations
Jerry M. Hamovit
M. R. Schlesinger
INTRODUCTION
Just as the graduated income tax applicable to individuals led to the
formation of family partnerships with a consequent fragmentation of a
single economic entity into several taxable entities, so has the difference in
the tax applicable to the first $25,000 of a corporation's taxable income
from that applied on taxable income in excess of $25,000 led to the
division of a single economic entity into multiple corporatons. The
2% additional tax levied on the privilege of filing a consolidated re-
turn, together with the extraordinarily complicated requirements appli-
cable to such returns, further effectively discouraged corporate taxpayers
who might otherwise have been agreeable to lumping together their
various corporate operations.
While the Revenue Act of 1964 has done nothing to reduce the
complexity of consolidation, it has made significant changes in the area
of tax treatment of multiple corporations. Originally, the President
proposed that commonly-controlled corporations be limited to one cor-
porate surtax exemption. While the Congress did not accept that recom-
mendation, it has in the Revenue Act of 1964 attempted, at least to some
extent, to encourage corporations that are part of a single corporate
family to be treated on a unified basis for federal income tax purposes.
The Treasury Department of course recognized that a reduction in
the normal corporate tax rate from 30% to 22% would substantially
stimulate the proliferation of claimants to additional surtax exemptions.1
The surtax exemption and the new 22% rate were designed to benefit
and stimulate small business, not to benefit large enterprises operating
through a chain of separately incorporated units.2 Congress therefore
acted to insure that this reduction in the normal corporate tax rate would
not encourage that proliferation, and at the same tme attempted to
forestall unlimited further acquisition of this benefit intended for small
business.
1. Materials submitted by the Treasury Department before the House Ways and Means
Committee during the hearings on the legislation that culminated in the Revenue Act of
1964 estimated that the tax reduction that ensued from fragmenting a business into
separate corporations and daiming multiple surtax exemptions might run as high as 42%
of the tax normally applicable to that business in the absence of multiple exemptions.
STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 81ST CONG., 1ST SESS., PRESI-
DENT'S 1963 TAx MESSAGE 160 (Comm. Print 1963).
2. 109 CONG. REC. 966 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1963).
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CONSOLIDATED RETURNS
For many years the Internal Revenue Code has permitted the filing
of a consolidated tax return by multiple corporations, provided the cor-
porations were part of an affiliated group.' The existence of an affiliated
group depended basically on a common parent and its 80% or more
owned subsidiaries, none of whlch fell in such proscribed categories as
foreign corporations or insurance companies.4 The consolidated return
was of course available only where the parent-subsidiary relationship ex-
isted, and not in the case of brother-sister corporations.'
The Revenue Act of 1964 has made no change whatever in the
right to file a consoldiated return; but it has, for taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1963, eliminated the 2% additional tax previously
imposed on groups (other than regulated public utilities) filing such
returns.' While the Treasury Department conditioned its recommenda-
tion for elimination of this 26% additional tax upon a limitation of com-
monly controlled corporations to only one surtax exemption,7 the Congress
removed this additional 2% tax without imposing the limitation re-
quested on surtax exemptions. Where the corporate tax rate for an affili-
ated group filing consolidated returns may previously have been 54%
of taxable income, the elimination of this additional tax, combined
with the general reduction in corporate income tax rates, results in a
reduction of from 54% to 48% in the income tax rate applicable to
groups that heretofore filed a consolidated return. Their after-tax earn-
ings are thus increased more than 10%, without any change in earnings
prior to tax.
THE 100% DIVIDEND-RECEIVED DEDUCTION
Inter-company transactions between members of an affiliated group
are generally eliminated by the group filing a consolidated return. In
particular, the group is permitted in consolidation to exclude from in-
come 100% of dividends received from members of the affiliated group'
and is not limited to the usual 85 % exclusion.'
The act recognizes that some affiliated groups may properly not de-
sire or be qualified to file a consolidated return, but should still not be
dened this 100% exclusion of dividends received from other members
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1501 [hereinafter cited as CODE §].
4. CODE § 1504.
5. Ray Engineering Co., Inc., 42 T.C. No. 88 (Sept. 29, 1964)
6. CODE § 1503(a)
7 STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 81ST CONG., 1ST SESS., PRESI-
DENT'S 1963 TAx MESSAGE 36 (Comm. Print 1963).
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502(b) (2) (ii) (1955) (hereinafter cited as Reg. fl.
9. CODE § 24 3(a).
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of the group, provided the group accepts the principal burdens of con-
solidaton." This permitted 100% exclusion may be utilized by a group
that does not file a consolidated return.because of :practical. inability to
cope with the extraordinarily .complex Treasury Regulations. governing
such returns."
Alternatively, it may be availed of-:because one, member of the group
has, and wishes to retain, a differentvaccounting. method or taxable year
than other members of the group.- Similarly, it may be utilized where
one member of the group is an insurance company; in such a case the
group is disqualified from filing a consolidated return, presumably be-
cause of the specig& rates and principles applicable to insurance com-
panies. In these circumstances, provided the necessary parent and 80%9
owned subsidiary relationshlp exists, the Revenue Act of 1964 permits
the 100% exclusion from taxable income of 'dividends received from
other members of the group, provided certain requirements are met.
This 100% exclusion-is available for "qualifying dividends" received
from other members of the same affiliated group. 2 "In order to be a
qualifying dividend, the dividend must be from post-1963 earnings.'"
Just as elsewhere in the Code a dividend is conclusively presumed to
be from the most recent undistributed earnings.'4 Moreover, during the
entire year from which the earnings are derived, both the payer and the
payee must have been part of the same affiliated group, and that group
must not have claimed separate surtax exemptions. The common parent
and its subsidiaries comprising the affiliated group must file an election to
obtain this 100% dividend exclusion by the due date, as extended, of
the parent's tax return for the year in question. 5 While this election
is in effect, the group is limited to only one surtax exemption, one ac-
cumulated earnings credit, one exemption from estimated tax, and one
of each of the similar limitations or exemptions applicable to corpora-
tions, notwithstanding the fact that separate tax returns were filed by
the corporations forming a part of the group."
This election of the 100% exclusion of qualifying dividends may be
10. Secretary Dillon acknowledged that earnings of an 80%-owned subsidary are more
directly the earnings of the parent than is the case where one corporation derives invest-
ment income from an unrelated corporation. STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS, 81ST CONG., 1ST SEsS., PREsDEN's 1963 TAX MESSAGE 81 (Comm. Print
1963).
11. It takes approximately 75 pages for one major tax service to set forth these Regula-
tions.
12. CODE § 243(b) (1).
13. CODE § 243(b) (1) (B).
14. CODE § 316(a); S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1964).
15. CODE 5 243 (b) (2). Wholly owned subsidiaries are deemed to consent to this elec-
tion when it is filed by the parent. Temporary Reg. § 19.5-1(b) (1964).
16. CODE § 243(b) (3); S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1964).
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terminated either by filing a consent to termination by the affiliated
group, or by a new member of the group affirmatively refusing to
consent to the election.'7 Unlike the termination of a Subchapter S
election, or the termination of an election to claim multiple surtax ex-
emptions, discussed later, in which cases termination of the election bars
re-election of the special tax treatment involved for such periods as five
years, there is no limitation on re-election to exclude 100% of qualifying
dividends from taxable income. In this respect, this pseudo-consolidated
return is markedly superior to the filing of an actual consolidated return,
where the consent of the Commissioner or a significant change in the
tax laws is generally required to switch back and forth from the filing
of such returns."8
IMPORTANCE OF MULTIPLE SURTAX EXEMPTIONS
It has thus far been shown that when corporations are associated in
such a fashion as to be designated an "affiliated group," they then may file
consolidated returns or may file what amounts to pseudo-consolidated
returns pursuant to which certain inter-corporate dividends are 100% -
exempt from income tax. Attention is now directed to associated cor-
porations which, under the amendments to the 1954 Code by the 1964
Act, are classified as "controlled groups." Such a dassification is un-
favorable, and corporations which fall in this unfortunate category are
faced with three choices. Moreover, inasmuch as some associated cor-
porations which qualify as "affiliated groups" will also qualify as "con-
trolled groups," it follows that five rather than three choices will be
available. The two optional choices have already been discussed; thus,
consideration is now directed to the remaining three. Since the three
choices which are peculiar to controlled groups all relate to the use of
multiple surtax exemptions, it is appropriate to examine first the tax
importance of these exemptions.
Tax Value of Each Surtax Exemption
The normal tax of a corporation is 22% and this rate applies to all
of a corporation's income.'9 The 26% added surtax, however, applies
only to a corporation's taxable income in excess of $25,000.2° Thus,
there is a surtax exemption which relates to the first $25,000 of a
corporation's taxable income. Manifestly, therefore, the tax value of that
surtax exemption to a corporation is 26% of $25,000, or $6,500 in the
case of any corporation which has $25,000 or more of taxable income.
17 CODE § 243(b) (4)
18. Reg. § 1.1502-11 (1955)
19. CODE §§ ii(a), (b).
20. CODE §§ 11(c), (d)
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Valuation of Multiple Surtax Exemptions
While it is true, therefore, that the value of each surtax exemption
is $6,500 (assuming throughout that a corporation's taxable income is
$25,000 or more), the aggregate value of multiple surtax exemptions
in the case of associated corporations is not the number of corporations
times $6,500. By way of example, if three associated corporations each
has more than $25,000 of taxable income, it is quite true that the value
of each exemption is 26% of $25,000, or $6,500. The benefit of ob-
taining multiple exemptions, as compared with the single exemption
which would obtain if there were only one corporation, is manifestly not
three times $6,500, but two times $6,500, or $13,000. This concept is
rather important to matters which will follow- the value of mutiple sur-
tax exemptions, as compared with a single exemption, will ordinarily be
$6,500 times the number of corporations reduced by one.
CHOICES IF A CONTROLLED GROUP
It is inportant to keep in mind that classification as a controlled
group is unfavorable, and that the three choices of a controlled group are
alternatives which must be faced willy-nilly, i.e., its choice is only among
these alternatives.2'
Single $25,000 Exemption Apportioned Equally
If a group of corporations in a controlled group does nothing in the
way of electing one of the other two choices, then a single $25,000 ex-
emption will be apportioned equally among the corporations.22
Apportionment of $25,000 Exemption as Desired
Under the second alternative, the group of corporations is still limited
in the aggregate to one $25,000 surtax exemption, but all of the corpora-
tions may elect to apportion that $25,000 exemption in any manner
desired.23 Suppose, for example, the taxable income of Corporation
No. 1 is $15,000 and the taxable income of Corporation No. 2 is
$10,000, the two corporations being the sole members of a controlled
group. Manifestly, an equal apportionment of the surtax exemption
would result in Corporation No. 1 needlessly paying a 26% surtax on
$2,500 of its $15,000 of taxable income; that is to say, $2,500 of the
21. CODE 5§ 1561-62.
22. CODE § 1561(a) (1), (2), 1562.
23. CODE 5 1561(a)(2).
1965]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
surtax exemption would be lost. Accordingly, both corporations should
elect to apportion the single $25,000 surtax exemption so that Corpora-
tion No. 2 claims only $10,000, but Corporation No. 1 has available
to it $15,000 of that exemption.
Election of Multiple Surtax Exemptions
By far the most fascinating alternative is that of electing multiple
surtax exemptions. Under this provision, the various corporations of a
controlled group can elect to have each corporation accorded a full
$25,000 of surtax exemption. 4 If that is done, however, there is an
added 6% tax on each corporation's taxable income up to $25 ,000.25
Thus, the first $25,000 of each. corporation's taxable income will be
taxed not at the conventional, rate of 22%, but at a rate of 28%.
The question of whether to elect multiple surtax exemptions arises
frequently in the everyday business practices of lawyers. As a result, it
is important that attorneys realize that before they can properly advise
on this third choice it will be necessary for them to compare the advantage
of electing multiple surtax exemptions with the cost of electing such
exemptions.
It has been shown above that generally the advantage of multiple
surtax exemptions, as compared with the advantage of a single surtax
exemption, is $6,500 times the number of corporations minus one. As
has been shown, there is a cost in obtaining this advantage: 6% of
each corporation's taxable income up to $25,000.
In making a decision of whether or not to elect multiple surtax
exemptions, it will be necessary to compare the above advantage with
the above cost. The net saving or the net detriment will of course lie in
the excess of the advantage over the cost, or the cost over the advantage,
as the case may be.
For those who are opposed to the use of formulae, there is a longer
way of arriving at the same comparison. Under this alternative method,
one simply computes the total taxes of a group of corporations which
do not elect the multiple surtax exemptions, and then compares that fig-
ure with the total taxes which result if the election is chosen. The fol-
lowing two examples are illustrative of this method. In both examples
assume two corporations with aggregate taxable incomes of $50,000. In
Example No. 1, assume that each corporation has $25,000 of taxable in-
come. The tax results then work out as follows:
24. CODE § 1562(a) (1).
25. CODE § 1562(b)
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ExAMpr No. 1
(Two-corporations each with $25,000 taxable income)
a.' If no election:
22% of $50,000 $11,000
26% of $25,000 ------------------------ 6,500
$17,500
b. If elect
28% of $50,000 $14,000
Saving by electing --------------------- $ 3,500
The election saves $3,500 in taxes. However, that can be checked
out rather readily with use of the formula suggested above. The value
of the multiple surtax exemption in this case is one (%.e., the two corpora-
tions minus one) times $6,500, or $6,500, as compared with the cost
of electing the exemption which is 6% of $50,000, or $3,000. The
resulting indicated saving is $3,500.
In Example No. 2, the two corporations still have aggregate taxable
incomes of $50,000, but it will be assumed that Corporation No. 1 has
taxable income of $49,000 whereas Corporation No. 2 has taxable in-
come of only $1,000. In this case, the taxes and the indicated loss by
electing the multiple surtax exemptionswork out as follows:
EXAMPLE No. 2
(One corporation with $49,000 and the second corporation
with $1,000 of taxable income)
a. If no election:
22% of $50,000 ---------------------- $11,000
26% of $25,000 .(Assume exemption is not
spread equally but is allocated so that first cor-
poration received at least $24,000 of the ex-
emption.) ----------------------------- 6,500
$17,500
b. If elect-
22% of $50,000 ---------------------- $11,000
6% of $26,000 ------------------------ 1,560
26% of $24,000 ------------------------ 6,240
- $18,800
Loss by electing -------------------- $ ,300
19651
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The loss by electing the multiple surtax exemptions in Example No. 2
can also be readily checked against the suggested formula. The cost
of the election is 6% of $26,000 (%.e., each corporation's taxable in-
come up to $25,000), or $1,560. The advantage of the election, how-
ever, is rather minimal. If only a single surtax exemption is used, $25,-
000 of taxable income is exempt from the 26% surtax; if by contrast
multiple surtax exemptions are used, only $26,000 of taxable income
is exempted from surtax, because the second corporation has only $1,000
of taxable income. As a result, the election excludes from surtax only
an additional $1,000 of taxable income. Therefore, the election saves in
gross only $260, as compared with the cost of $1,560, resulting in the
above indicated loss of $1,300.
It has been widely suggested that, as a rule of thumb, when a con-
trolled group of corporations has aggregate taxable income in excess of
approximately $32,500 and when none of the corporations has a loss, it
will generally pay for that group of corporations to elect multiple surtax
exemptions. That suggestion is exactly what it purports to be, merely
a rule of thumb. Example No. 2 above demonstrates this rather vividly;
the corporations have an aggregate taxable income of $50,000, but as
has been shown there is actually a substantial loss by electing multiple
surtax exemptions in spite of the fact that the aggregate corporate in-
come is substantially above the level suggested by the rule of thumb.
The moral is, of course, that such a rule of thumb cannot be depended
upon in actual practice.2"
COMMON TAXABLE YE3AR
If in a given taxable year two or more corporations are members of a
controlled group, they are then faced with the alternative tax choices
which have been discussed. As a result, it becomes necessary to deter-
mine which taxable years are under consideration for members of a con-
trolled group when the different corporations have different taxable
years. Although the new tax provisions for this purpose use the term
"'taxable year,"2T reference herein will be made to the "common taxable
year." To determine the common taxable year for a group of corpora-
tions, it is necessary to look at a given December 31. The common tax-
able year for all members of a controlled group is that taxable year for
each of them which ends on a given December 31, or embraces a given
26. Mr. Edward J. Hawkins, Jr., suggests that the rule of thumb will work universally
when stated in this qualified fashion: A controlled group should elect multiple surtax
exemptions whenever the aggregate taxable incomes (excluding taxable income over $25,000
sn the case of each corporatton) exceed $32,500, and vice versa. Repeated tests have failed
to prove hun wrong.
27 CODE §5 1561(a), 1561(a) (2), 1563(b) (1), (2)
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December 31.28 For purposes of illustration, assume a simple example
of Corporation No. 1 whose calendar year ends December 31, 1964, and
Corporation No. 2 whose fiscal year ends September 30, 1965. Those
two years are common years for the two corporations, and if they are
members of a controlled group then only one surtax exemption is avail-
able to them for those years, 9 unless they elect the multiple surtax ex-
emption option and pay the added 6% tax."
MANNER AND TIME OF MAKING ELECTION
Election to Apportion One Surtax Exemption Equally
Temporary Regulations have been issued setting out a rather excep-
tional rule applicable to corporations with years ending prior to Decem-
ber 31, 1964, which corporations desire to apportion a simple surtax ex-
emption equally.31 At this late date there is little concern with that ex-
ceptional rule. The general rule respecting corporations having years
ending December 31, 1964 or later, however, is of great importance.
Although the statute itself is not specific and expressly leaves the manner
and time of making an election up to the Commissioner in his Regula-
tons, 2 these temporary Regulations now provide that election must be
made on or before three years after the return due date for that corpora-
tion whose tax return due date is the earliest in a given component group
for a given common taxable year.3  Suppose, however, that instead of
waiting until the latest possible date to make an election, this determina-
tion to apportion one $25,000 surtax exemption unequally is made at the
time the earliest return is filed, or at any rate before the time limit has
expired. Suppose further that on audit of the tax returns by an Internal
Revenue agent, the taxable income is shifted around among the corpo-
rations in such a fashion as to make it advisable to reallocate the one sur-
tax exemption. Will it be permissible to reallocate that $25,000 even
though a different election was previously made? The Regulations do
not deal with this question, but presumably the answer will be in the
affirmative, so that reallocation will be permitted within the time allowed
for an original election; perhaps the permanent Regulations will purport
to answer this question.
Election of Multiple Surtax Exemptions
The new law is explicit on when multiple surtax exemptions may be
elected. This option may be exercised at any time within three years
28. Ibld.
29. CoDH S 1561.
30. CODE 5 1562.
31. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 19.5-1(b) (1964).
32. CODE § 1561(a) (2).
33. Temp. Treas. Reg. 5 19.5-1(a) (1964).
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after the due date of the earliest income tax return for a controlled group
with respect to any given common taxable year. 4 The law is explicit
that this three-year period is not extended by virtue of any extension of
time for filing a tax return." The election, once made, will hold over
from year to year and it is not necessary to refile. 6 Explicit provision is
made for termination at any time within the same three-year period, this
termination to be exercised by unanimous consent of all members of the
controlled group, or if a new member has come into the group, then by
that member filing a non-consent.37 In order to prevent vacillation back
and forth, there is express provision that once a multiple surtax exemp-
tion has been terminated, the election may not be reinstated for approxi-
mately five years thereafter. 8
DEFINITION OF "CONTROLLED GROUP"
It has been shown that a controlled group is an unfavorable classifi-
cation because such controlled group members are remitted to a single
surtax exemption, or a 6% added tax for electing multiple surtax exemp-
tions. Accordingly, it becomes necessary to determine when this unfavor-
able classification as a controlled group exists.
Parent-substdiary Corporations
A parent-subsidiary chain of corporations may qualify unfavorably as a
controlled group. In order to qualify each corporate member of the group,
excepting the parent corporation, must have 80% of its stock, reckoned
by vote or value, owned by one or more of the other corporations in the
chain."9 Furthermore, there must be a parent corporation which owns
80% or more, by vote or value, of one or more of the corporations in
that same chain."' The definition of a controlled group for the purpose
of determining whether a parent-subsidiary relationship will qualify as
such a group is somewhat similar to a definition of an "affiliated group"
for purposes of determining whether consolidated returns or pseudo-con-
solidated returns may be filed.41 In the'latter connection, however, only
an 80 % voting test obtains, while for purposes of an affiliated group the
80% test is met if there be either a stock.,voting or a stock value qualifi-
cation. As a result, it will be appreciated that whenever a parent-sub-
34. CODE $ 1562(e).
35. CODS 5 1562(e) (1).
36. CODE 51562(a) (2).
37 CODB § 1562(c).
38. CODE § 1562(d)
39. CODE § 1563(a) (1) (A).
40. CODE § 1563(a) (1) (B).
41. See CODE § 1504(a) (1).
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siliary relationship qualifying- as a controlled group exists, that same
group will always qualify as an affiliated group; in addition, however,
because of the additional 80% value test for purposes of a controlled
group, a controlled group will frequently exist, given a vertical chain-of
corporations, where qualification is not-met for purposes of an affiliated
group.
Brothber-stster Corporations
The controlled group concept is broader than the affiliated group
concept in an even more important respect. Thus, brother-sister corpora-
tions qualify as members of a controlled group whenever there -xists two
or more corporations 80% of whose stock, reckoned'by vote or value, is
owned by one individual, estate or trust. In view of the requirement
that 80% of the stock be owned by one individual, estate or trust, one
might suppose that unfavorable classification of a brother-sister group of
corporations can be easily avoided. .Unfortunately, however, things are
not that easy because, as will be shown presently, a new set of the ubiqui-
tous attribution rules has been formulated' for the purpose of attributing
constructive ownership of stock where actual ownership does not exist.
Combinations of Parent-subsudiary and Brother-stster Groups
of Corporations
The law recognizes that in groups of three or more corporations one
or more of such corporations might qualify both as a member of a parent-
subsidiary controlled group and as a member of a brother-sister controlled
group.48 In such a case, the two groupings are aggregated and the par-
ent-subsidiary controlled group, as well as the brother-sister controlled
group, are treated as a single controlled group.
As a general rule, in determining whether the 80 % stock test is met
so that a controlled group does exist, one looks to-the stockholding situ-
ation as of a given December 3 1.4  This December 31 date; for pur-
poses of determining application-of the 80% testUes wini.the con-
cept of a common taxable year. As has been shown, the com mon taxable
years for various members of a controlled group are those taxable years
which. end on a given December 31, or embrace a given December 31.
To this rule that a corporation qualifies or disqualifies as a member of a
controlled group depending upon stock ownership as of a given: Decem-
42. CODE 5 1563(a) (2).
43. CODE § 1563(a) (3).
44. CoD 5 1563(b).
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ber 31, however, there are two exceptions to which attention is now di-
rected.
Additional Members
Even though a corporation is not a member of a controlled group
on a given December 31 and hence does not fall within the general rule
respecting controlled group membership, if that corporation meets the
80 % stock requirement for one-half or more of the days prior to Decem-
ber 31 falling within that corporation's particular fiscal year, then
that corporation will nevertheless be deemed a member of the controlled
group.4" By way of example, assume a corporation with a fiscal year end-
ing November 30. 1965. Assume that this corporation's stock was
owned 100% by an individual who also owns 100% of the stock in a
second corporation. Assume, however, that this individual disposes of
his stock in the first corporation on December 17, 1964. As a result,
the first corporation is not a member of the controlled group under that
general rule on December 31, 1964, the critical date under the general
rule. Under this exceptional rule, however, the first corporation is
treated as an additional member of the controlled group because for more
than one-half of the days falling prior to December 31, 1964, such days
being within its November 30, 1965 fiscal year, it did meet the 80%
stock ownership test.
Excluded Members
The excluded member exclusion is a corollary to the additional mem-
ber exception. Thus, even though a corporation on December 31 meets
the test as a member of a controlled group, if it was a member for less
than one-half of its days prior to a given December 31, which days fall
within its taxable year embracing that December 31, then it will be ex-
cluded as a member of the controlled group.46 Assume again a corpo-
ration with a November 30 fiscal year. Assume further that 100% of
its stock was acquired on December 17, 1964, by the same person who
owns 100% of the stock in a second corporation. Even though that sec-
ond corporation qualifies as a member of a controlled group under the
general December 31 rule, it was a member for less than one-half of its
days ending prior to December 31, 1964, which days fall within its No-
vember 30, 1965 fiscal year; accordingly, it is deemed an excluded mem-
ber.
Manifestly, these exceptional rules dealing with additional and ex-
cluded members will lead in some cases to unexpected paradoxical results,
45. CODE S 1563(b) (3)
46. CoDH 51563(b) (2).
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as in the two examples discussed above. As corporate advisors it will be
necessary for attorneys to be aware of these rules in the planning stages
in determining whether and how to reset stock ownership to avoid con-
trolled group qualification.
Attribution Rules
In the case of parent-subsidiary groups, stock owned by one owner,
but subject to an option, is attributed to the optionee and treated as con-
structively owned by that optionee" The same rule applies in determin-
ing brother-sister controlled groups, but in the case of such groups an
additional series of attribution rules also applies.48 Thus, stock owned
by a partnership is attributed to its partners, stock owned by estates and
trusts to its beneficiaries, and stock owned by corporations to its stock-
holders; oddly enough, however, the converse of these rules does not ap-
ply so that, for example, stock owned by partners is not attributed to a
partnership. With an exception of limited application, stock is attributed
between spouses and between minor children and parents. If an mdi-
vidual owns 50 9 or more in vote or value of stock, then there is attribu-
tion between adult children and parents and between grandchildren and
grandparents.
Excluded Stock
It has been observed that an 80% vote or value test is used in de-
termining whether a controlled group of corporations exists. Of intense
practical importance in this connection, however, are detailed provisions
for excluding as outstanding stock certain stock in certain situations.49
Thus, nonvoting preferred stock is not counted."0 While that exception
is rather understandable, there is a whole series of other exceptions which
no doubt will frequently be overlooked and which offer some very real
pitfalls. Thus, where one corporation in a parent-subsidiary set-up owns
50% or more in stock or value of another corporation's stock, the other
stock (i.e., the stock not owned by that corporate holder of 50% or more
of the subsidiary's stock) is excluded if the other stock in the subsidiary
is held by a trust pursuant to a plan of deferred compensation, or if the
other stock in the subsidiary is owned by a principal stockholder of the
parent (as defined) or by an officer of the parent, or if the other stock is
owned by an employee of the subsidiary and is subject to certain condi-
tions respecting disposition of that stock running in favor of the parent
47. CODE §5 1563(d) (1), (e)(1), (f).
48. CODE §5 1563(d) (2), (e), (f).
49. CODE § 1563(c).
50. CODE § 1563(c) (1) (A).
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or subsidiary.5 In a rather similar fashion, in the case of brother-sister
relationships, certain other stock is excluded and not counted where an
individual, estate or trust owns 50% or more in vote or value of the stock
of a given corporation, where that other stock is held by a qualified em-
ployees' pension or profit-sharing trust, or where that other stock is clut-
tered with certain conditions respecting its disposition and these condi-
tions run in favor of the corporation or its principal stockholder (as
defined) 52
In brief, when 50 % or more in vote or value of the stock of a given
corporation is owned by another corporation, individual, estate or trust,
then the additional outstanding stock of that given corporation is not
counted as outstanding if the conditions set out in the statute apply. At
the practical level, the importance of the exclusion of this other stock is
that although in general, absent 80% actual or constructive stock owner-
sup, the unfavorable controlled group rules will not apply, corporate ad-
visors must be on their guard whenever 50% or more of the stock is
actually or constructively owned. Caution is then in order for if the
other stock jq excluded and treated as not outstanding, then for purposes
of the 80% computation one might find that 50% or more, but less than
80% of the stock which is owned, jumps up to 80% or more of that
stock which is counted. This is a very real trap unless this excluded stock
concept is borne in mind.
CONTINUING BARRIERS TO MULTIPLE
SURTAX EXEMPTION
It has been shown that the Revenue Act of 1964 does not preclude
the claiming of multiple surtax exemptions, but only imposes a 6%
higher tax rate on the first $25,000 of taxable income for each corpora-
tion in a controlled group claiming separate surtax exemptions. How-
ever, acceptance of this 6% additional tax may not be sufficient to pro-
tect a corporation's claim to a separate surtax exemption. Nothing in
the act limits the applicability of sectons 269, 482 or 1551 to members
of a controlled group that elect multiple surtax exemptions, and the com-
mittee reports make it abundantly clear that the application of these
statutes to multi-corporate enterprises continues unabated.53 Thus, section
269 may be invoked to deny surtax exemptions where there has been an
acquisition of control of a corporation where the principal purpose was
to secure an additional surtax exemption. 4 Of course, where the
51. CODE 5 1563(c) (2) (A).
52. CODE § 1563(c) (2) (B).
53. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1963); S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 150 (1964)
54. James Realty Co. v. United States, 280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960).
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taxpayer is able to establish that its principal purpose in a multiple cor-
porate operation was not the securing of additional surtax- exemptions,
section 269 cannot be utilized to deny that tax benefit."
An additional barrier to multiple surtax exemptions is section: 482
which permits the reallocation of income, deductions, credits and allow-
ances between commonly-controlled entities when the Commissioner de-
termines that reallocation is necessary to prevent tax evasion or.clearly
to reflect income.5 " Likewise, section 61 has been utilized, and may in
the future continue to be utilized, to tax income of an entire group of
corporations to one corporation of this group if the income is really
earned by that corporation.5
Finally, section 1551 which applies to transfers of property to a new
or .previously dormant corporation where a major purpose for the trans-
fer was the securing of an additional surtax exemption, not only may
continue to be utilized by the Service against a multi-corporate enterprise,
but has been significantly strengthened by the Revenue Act of 1964.
Enlarged Scope of Section 1551
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1964, it was a relatively simple matter
to protect additional surtax exemptions from the bite of section 1551
since the applicable Treasury Regulations indicated this section did not
apply to indirect transfers of property, but only to direct ones. As a con-
sequence, the Commissioner was frequently forced to rely on sections 269
or 482, rather than utilizing section 1551 with its references to "a major
purpose" rather than "the principal purpose." However, the amendments
to section 1551, which apply to transfers after June 12, 1963, will per-
mit the Service to invoke this section with greater ease. In fact, high
officials of the Internal Revenue Service have indicated that they consider
these amendments to provide the most effective weapon available against
further proliferation of multi-corporate operations.
Application to indirect transfers.-Section 1551 now applies not
only to direct transfers of property between corporations and a clear split-
ting-up of the assets or operations of a corporation, but also to indirect
transfers of property other than money.5" However, the section continues
to be inapplicable where the transfer to the new corporation is only of
money, and that money is not utilized to acquire property from the share-
holder-transferor.
Statements of congressional leaders on the floor of Congress indicate
55. Bush Hog Mfg. Co., Inc., 42 T.C. No. 52 (July 16, 1964).
56. Compare Hamburgers York Road, Inc., 41 T.C. 821 (1964), with Bush Hog Mfg. Co.,
Inc., supra note 55.
57. Shaw Constr. Co. v. United States, 323 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1963).
58. 110 CONG. REC. 3401, 3428-29 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1964).
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that section 1551 is, however, not intended to be utilized against indirect
transfers of property that are a normal consequence of expansion of busi-
ness activities, as opposed to a mere change of location or organization of
a business activity previously conducted. 9 Of course, there is no test pro-
vided for defining what is a business expansion, and presumably pro-
tracted litigation will be necessary before such a test is available.
Transfers by indivuluals and commonly controlled corporations.-In
addition, the act extends section 1551 for the first time to transfers of
property to a new corporation by individuals, as well as to transfers by
commonly-controlled corporations. It now applies to transfers of prop-
erty (other than money) by five or fewer individuals where these indi-
viduals are in control of another corporation. In such cases, where a
major purpose for the transfer was the securing of an additional surtax
exemption, section 1551 results in the loss of that separate surtax ex-
emption.'
With respect to transfers by five or fewer individuals, they must pos-
sess control of both the transferee corporation and another corporation.
For this purpose, control requires ownership of stock with at least 80%
of the voting power or value of both corporations, and more than 50%
of the stock when taking into account only identical stockholdings of
both corporations.6 To illustrate tus latter requirement, assume share-
holders A, B, and C own 10%, 70%, and 20% respectively, of the
stock in Corporation X, and 70%, 5%, and 25% respectively, of the
stock in Corporation Y
Corporation Corporation Identical
X Y Stockholdings
A ------ 10% 70% 10%
B ----------- 70 5 5
C ----------- 20 25 20
In this example, the identical stockholdings total only 35 % and as
a consequence section 1551 is inapplicable. However, should B sell A
20% of the shares of Corporation X, the identical stockholdings would
increase to 55% and section 1551 might apply. In computing stock
ownerslup of individuals for control purposes under section 1551, the
attribution rules that apply to controlled groups are applicable.62
Finally, if either section 1551 or section 269 results in the disallow-
ance of a surtax exemption, the additional 6% tax generally applicable to
a controlled group of corporations electing separate surtax exemptions
59. CODE § 1551(a) (3).
60. CODE § 1551(b) (2)
61. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. A212-13 (1963).
62. CODE § 1551(b).
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does not apply.63 However, this provision for the inapplicability of the
additional 6% tax does not apply to cases of reallocation of income such
as section 482 presents. Of course, if as is usually the case the Commis-
sioner utilizes section 482 to reallocate all of a corporation's income, no
practical problem occurs.
CONCLUSION-
As has been shown, an affiliated group of corporations may file a
consolidated return without payment of additional tax, or file separate
returns and exclude 100% of dividends received from other members of
the group from income. A controlled group of corporations also has a
number of choices, dividing one surtax exemption equally or dispropor-
tonately within the group, or claiming separate surtax exemptions and
paying a 28% tax on the first $25,000 of each corporation's taxable in-
come. In any event, the Revenue Act of 1964 presents a multi-corporate
enterprise with numerous and difficult alternatives. And even after elect-
ing the course it will follow, such an enterprise continues to face the tradi-
tonal hurdles of sections 269, 482 and 61, as well as an expanded sec-
tion 1551. Clearly, sound guidance from competent tax practitioners is
a necessity in reaching decisions in this area.
63. CODE § 1562(b) (1) (B).
1965]
